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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
GENDER-BASED STATUTORY RAPE LAW DOES NOT
VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE:
Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County
In a series of cases since Frontiero v. Richardson,I the Supreme Court
has developed a "middle tier '

2

standard of review for use in gender-

discrimination cases under the equal protection clause. This "middle
tier" analysis lies somewhere between the "rational basis" test3 and the
"strict scrutiny" test,4 and requires that statutory classifications based on
gender bear a "substantial relationship" to "important governmental
objectives." 5 Purporting to apply this test, a plurality of the Supreme
Court in Michael v. Superior Court of Sonoma County 6 upheld the Califor7
nia statutory rape law.
The Court in MichaeliM. asserted that punishing only the male participant for sexual intercourse with a minor female is substantially related to the important governmental objective of preventing illegitimate
teenage pregnancy.8 The holding represents an improper application of
the middle tier test of constitutionality in the context of gender discrimination. At best, the ruling is an instance of judicial carelessness creating
an anomaly in the equal protection doctrine. At worst, it may create a
1 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
2 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); infra notes 5, 21-22 and accompanying text.
3 See Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,
253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) ("[T]he classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation. ..

2).

4 The strict scrutiny test applies to cases involving suspect classfications, such as race
and national origin, and those involving fundamental rights. Under the test, the Court only
upholds statutes that discriminate against suspect classes or impair fundamental rights when
they are "necessary " to implement "compelling" governmental objectives. See, e.g., Illinois
Election Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979) (right to vote as a fundamental right); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (race as a suspect class); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (national origin as a suspect class).
5 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
6 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
7 CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West Supp. 1982). Section 261.5 defines "unlawful sexual
intercourse" as "an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not the wife of the
perpetrator, where the female is under the age of 18 years."
8 Justice Rehnquist wrote the plurality opinion, in which Chief Justice Burger, Justice
Stewart, and Justice Powell joined. Justices Stewart and Blackmun wrote concurring opinions. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices White and Marshall joined,
and Justice Stevens filed a separate dissenting opinion. See infia notes 53-68 and accompanying text.
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potentially disastrous category of cases in which the biological differences between men and women can justify gender classifications.
I
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Constitutional protection against gender discrimination emerged
only recently. Prior to 1971, the Supreme Court upheld gender-based
classifications after only minimal scrutiny, with little concern for the intent of the legislation or its effect on women. Legislation designed to
"protect" the "weaker" 9 sex abounded, and the Court upheld these statutes as a matter of course.' 0 The reasoning in Muller v. Oregon"I illustrates the then-prevailing view:
[A woman] is properly placed in a class by herself, and legislation
designed for her protection may be sustained, even when like legislation is not necessary for men and could not be sustained. It is impossible to close one's eyes to the fact that she still looks to her brother and
depends upon him. .

.

. [H]er physical structure and a proper dis-

charge of her maternal functions-having in view not merely her own
health, but the well-being of the race-justify legislation to protect
12
her from the greed as well as the passion of man.
The first indication of change came in Reed v. Reed, 13 when the
Supreme Court, applying the rational basis test, 14 invalidated an Idaho
statute that, for administrative ease, gave mandatory preference to
males over similarly situated females seeking appointments to administer estates. The Court found that the equal lrotection clause was
designed to prevent precisely this kind of arbitrary discrimination.' 5 Because the legislative classification bore no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest, the Court held the statute
unconstitutional.
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977).
See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (Florida statute providing that no woman
shall be called for jury service unless she volunteers held not to violate equal protection
clause); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (Michigan statute permitting women bartenders only when woman is wife or daughter of bar owner held not to violate equal protection clause) (overruled by Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.23 (1976)); Muller v. Oregon,
208 U.S. 412 (1908) (Oregon statute regulating only women's working hours held not to violate the equal protection clause). See generaly Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal
Rights Amendment: A ConstitutionalBasis for Equal Rightsfor Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 876-79
(1971).
11 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
12 Id at 422.
13 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
14 See supra note 3.
15 404 U.S. at 76 ("To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make
the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. .. 2).
9

10
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Two years later, in Frontierov. Richardson, 16 the Court departed more
radically from the "romantic paternalism"' 7 of earlier equal protection
cases involving gender-based classifications. The Court in Frontiero invalidated a statute that afforded servicemen automatic housing allowances and health benefits for their wives, but required servicewomen
to prove their husbands' dependency to qualify for the same benefits. A
plurality of the Court held that married servicewomen were entitled to
the same benefits as married servicemen. In reaching this conclusion,
the plurality1 8 held that "classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect and must therefore be subjected to close judicial scrutiny."' 9
Although the Frontiero plurality stated that gender is a suspect classification, the Court retreated from this position in subsequent cases; instead, it developed a less stringent "middle tier" level of review
applicable to cases of gender classification. 20 This two-prong test, first
articulated in Craig v. Boren,2' requires that the governmental objective
underlying the statute be "important," and that the gender-based classi22
fication be "substantially related" to the objective.
A. Important Governmental Objectives
The Supreme Court has never proposed a method for determining
what constitutes an "important governmental objective" under the middle tier test. Under the rational basis test, the Court will accept as the
legislative purpose any objective that might "reasonably be conceived to
justify [the classification]. '23 Under the strict scrutiny test, the Court
16

411 U.S. 677 (1973).

Id at 684.
Justice Brennan wrote the Frontiero plurality opinion, in which Justices Douglas,
White, and Marshall joined. Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment, agreeing that the
'7
18

challenged statute represented unconstitutionally invidious discrimination. Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Powell and Blackmun also concurred, but stated that "it is unnecessary
for the Court in this case to characterize sex as a suspect classification." Id. at 691-92. Justice
Rehnquist dissented without writing an opinion.
19
d at 688.
20 Since Fronlier, the Court has applied the intermediate level of scrutiny to classes other
than gender. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 766-67 (1977) (requiring that statutory classifications based on illegitimacy bear "some rational relationship to a legitimate state
purpose," but noting that the standard is not "a toothless one").
21 429 U.S. 190 (1976). In Craig, the Court struck down an Oklahoma statute that prohibited the sale of beer to men under 21, but allowed sales to women between 18 and 21. The
state asserted that the statute reflected a legislative concern with traffic safety, and presented
statistics showing that young men were more likely than young women to drive while intoxicated. The Court rejected the asserted justification, declaring that, even assuming that the
statute's purpose was the promotion of traffic safety, the gender classification was not substantially related to that objective. Id at 204. Furthermore, the Court expressed doubts that
enhanced traffic safety was the true purpose of the statute. Id at 199 n.7.
22 Id at 197.
23
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,425-26 (1961) (In upholding Maryland's "Sunday blue law" under the rational basis test, the Court noted that "[s]tate legislatures are
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demands a clearer showing of actual legislative intent. 24 No clear rule
has emerged for determining an acceptable legislative purpose under the
middle tier test; before finding an "important" interest, however, the
Court does appear to demand something more than any conceivable set
of facts to support a state's asserted legislative purpose. The Court has
suggested that, at the very least, it will reject an asserted legislative purpose if legislative history contradicts the assertion. 25 On the other hand,
it has declined to rule on the degree of deference to be accorded to state
26
assertions when legislative history is absent.
Assuming that the state persuades the Court that the asserted purpose indeed underlies the statute, the Court must then decide whether
that purpose is "important." Despite its failure to articulate a standard
by which to make this determination, the Court has recognized two different kinds of legislative objectives. The first and most common type is
the gender-based statute designed to implement gender-neutral goals,
such as providing for a family's sudden loss of a breadwinner, 27 simplify-

ing property transactions, 28 and eliminating costly hearings to determine eligibility for governmental benefits. 29 This kind of statute
employs the gender classification only as a means to these ends.
The other type of gender classification appears in compensatory
statutes enacted specifically to eradicate past discimination against
women. In these cases, gender classification is a necessary incident to
the statutory goal. The Court has exhibited a greater willingness to find
statutes with this so-called "benign" 30 purpose to be substantially related to an important governmental objective, than when the statute
involves classification for gender-neutral purposes.3 ' At the same time,
presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice,
their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any
state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.").
24 See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (acknowledging the vast deference usually accorded the state's asserted statutory purpose, but holding that when the statute
involves racial classifications the Court's "inquiry. . .is whether there clearly appears in the
relevant materials some overriding statutory purpose. ..2).
25 In contrast to the rational basis test, a potential rationale cannot justify discriminatory gender classifications if it contradicts relevant legislative history. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n. 16 (1975) ("This court need not in equal protection cases accept at
face value assertions of legislative purposes, when an examination of the legislative scheme
and its history demonstrates that the asserted purpose could not have been a goal of the
legislation.').
26 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 200 n.7 (1976) ("We leave] for another day consideration of whether the statement of the State's Assistant Attorney General should suffice to inform this Court of the legislature's objectives, or whether the Court must determine if the
litigant simply is selecting a convenient, but false, post hoc rationalization.').
27 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 651-52 (1975).
28 Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 459 (1981).
29 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 678-79 (1973).
30 See inra note 42 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
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however, the Court has often warily examined a state's assertion that a
compensatory purpose justifies the statutory classifications. Presumably,
this scrutiny protects against plausible, but false, post-hoe compensatory
rationalizations for statutory schemes.
Even when unconvinced by the state's asserted purpose, the Court
has assumed that the first prong of the middle tier test is satisfied, rely32
ing on the second prong of the test to reject the statutory classification.
This mode of analysis is not surprising, for specious purposes cast doubt
on the existence of a substantial relationship between gender classifications and state goals. Although a state's failure to demonstrate an important state purpose to the Court's satisfaction might alone support a
finding of unconstitutionality under the middle tier test, such a case has
yet to arise. Rather, the Court has focused most intently on the "relatedness" question that the second prong of the test poses, and has elected
to examine the state's asserted purpose mainly in this context.
B. SubstantialRelationships
Once the Court finds or assumes an important state objective, it
must inquire whether the gender classification is substantially related to
that purpose. The Court has relied on this prong of the middle tier test
to invalidate gender-classification schemes. Because of what it calls our
"long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination, ' 33 the Court demands a close nexus between statutory means and ends. This nexus is
the core of the middle tier test. The Court generally finds this nexus
only when the purpose of the challenged statute is compensatory; gender-based statutes serving gender-neutral purposes rarely pass constitu34
tional muster.
The Court has found that most gender classifications reflect outmoded stereotypes about societal gender roles, rather than studied attempts to achieve legislative ends. These legislative classifications
substitute gender-based generalizations for individualized inquiries and
equate functional definitions with gender classifications: "childrearer"
See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199-200 (1976).
U.S. at 684.
34 The Court has upheld gender classifications based on noncompensatory motives in
two cases. In Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), the Court upheld a Massachu32

33

Fronliero, 411

setts veterans' preference statute, finding that the statute, gender-neutral on its face, was

designed to give preference to veterans in state hiring and not to discriminate on the basis of
gender. In Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981), the Court upheld the gender-based draftregistration statute, asserting that because women were not employed by the military to work
in combat positions, the male-only draft was justified as a way to quickly provide combat
troops in wartime. The Court in Roisker deferred to Congress's determination ofmilitary need

because of the unique character of military decisions, and did not address the constitutionality of the underlying gender-based work-assignment statute. The military context of the rulings in these two equal protection cases have limited precedential value because of the
extraordinary deference that the Court accords Congress's decisions regarding the military.
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becomes "mother," "dependant" becomes "wife," and "breadwinner"
becomes "husband. '35 Although empirical support sometimes exists for
the assumptions underlying these gender classifications, the Court has
labeled this use of gender as "invidious," 36 and demands an "exceedingly persuasive justification" 37 for such statutes. For example, in Wengler v. DruggistsMutual Insurance Co., 38 the Court struck down a Missouri
worker's compensation law that automatically entitled widows to death
benefits, but prevented a widower from collecting death benefits unless
disabled or otherwise dependent on his wife's earnings. Similarly, in
Califano v. Coldfarb,3 9 the Court struck down a similar provision in the
Social Security Act4 because the assumption that wives are dependent
does "not suffice to justify a gender-based discrimination in the distribu'4 1
tion of employment-related benefits.
When the asserted statutory purpose is benign, however, the Court
appears more willing to accept gender classifications as a means of
achieving that compensatory goal. 42 Although under these "benign"
statutes gender classification replaces individualized inquiry into the effects of past discrimination, 43 the Court has accepted these gender classifications as substantially related to an important underlying
compensatory objective. Thus, in Kahn v. Shevin, 44 the Court upheld a
statute that allowed widows, but not widowers, to take property tax exemptions; the statute was designed "to further the state policy of cush35 See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 208-09 (1977); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
420 U.S. 636, 650-52 (1975); Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 688-89.
36 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 687.
37 Kirchberg, 450 U.S. at 461 (quoting Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273
(1979)).
38 446 U.S. 142 (1980).
39 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
40 42 U.S.C. § 402()(1) (1976). The statute in question was part of the Federal OldAge, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits (OASDI) program. See Calfano, 430 U.S. at
201.
41 430 U.S. at 217; see also Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) (Louisiana statute
giving husband exclusive control over community property did not further any state purpose
and was unconstitutional); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (provision of Social
Security Act granting survivors' benefits to wives of deceased wage earners but not to similarly situated husbands, held unconstitutional).
42 The Court first sanctioned the "benign" use of gender classifications in Kahn v.
Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). Ironically, the appellants' brief opposing the classification in
Kahn coined the expression "benign," in disputing the notion that special statutory "favors"
would help women attain equal status with men. Brief for the Appellants at 16, Kahn v.
Shevin, 417 U.S 351 (1973). Critics have continued to question the validity of compensatory
legislation for women. See generaly Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Benign Classifrationin the Context
of Sex, 10 CONN. L. REv. 813 (1978); Kanowitz, "Benign" Sex Disacminaion Its Troubles and
Their Cure, 31 HASTINGS LJ. 1379 (1980).
43 See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (statute providing for later discharge of female naval officers passed over for promotion than for male officers held constitutional as an attempt to compensate women, although it arguably allowed males to begin new
careers earlier than women); see also Ginsburg, supra note 42, at 818.
44 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
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ioning the financial impact of spousal loss upon the sex for which that
loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden. '45 In Calfano v. Webster,46 the Court upheld a provision of the Social Security Act that computed average monthly wages differently for men and women. The
Court found that Congress had "purposely enacted the more favorable
treatment for female wage earners to compensate for past employment
discrimination against women.

' 47

II
MICHAEL M. V SUPERIOR COURT OFSONOMA COUNTY

Seventeen-year-old Michael met sixteen-year-old Sharon at a bus
stop one night in June 1978. Both had been drinking. They walked to a
48 ,
park together and, after Michael struck her for initially refusing,
Sharon submitted to intercourse. Although a minor himself, Michael
49
was charged with a felony violation of California's statutory rape law,

which prohibits sexual intercourse with a minor female unless the female is the perpetrator's wife. After an unsuccessful motion to set aside
the information,50 Michael sought a writ of prohibition from the California Supreme Court to compel the Superior Court to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the statutory rape law violated the equal
protection clauses of both the California and United States Constitutions. The California Supreme Court denied the writ,5 1 and the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the validity of the
statute under the fourteenth amendment of the United States
52
Constitution.
Writing for the plurality,5
45

Id at 355.

46

430 U.S. 313 (1977).

3

Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that

Id at 318; see a/so Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
Although Sharon was a willing participant in the early stages of the intimacies, the
record indicates that Michael struck her when she initially refused intercourse. Id. at 485.
Neither the California Supreme Court nor the United States Supreme Court suggested that
Michael might have been more appropriately prosecuted for forcible rape. This aspect of the
case, however, might explain to some extent the unwillingness of the two courts to rule in
Michael's favor by striking down the statutory rape law.
49
CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West Supp. 1982); see also Michael M, 450 U.S. at 466
("The statute. . . makes men alone criminally liable for the act of sexual intercourse.").
50
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 995 (West 1970).
51
Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 25 Cal. 3d 608, 601 P.2d 572, 159
Cal. Rptr. 340 (1979) (adopting reasoning similar to that which the Supreme Court plurality
ultimately adopts); see Note, Unlawful Sexual Intercourse: Old Notions and a Suggested Reform, 12
PAC. LJ. 217 (1981) (critique of the California Supreme Court decision and a suggested
statutory reform).
52 447 U.S. 904 (1980).
53 ChiefJustice Burger, Justice Stewart, and Justice Powell joined in Justice Rehnquist's
opinion.
47
48
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54
California's statutory rape law discriminates on the basis of gender.
He concluded, however, that the asserted state purpose of preventing
illegitimate teenage pregnancy was an important governmental objective and that the gender classification was sufficiently related to that
purpose to satisfy the middle tier test of scrutiny. 55
To support the plurality's conclusion that California had asserted
an important state objective, Justice Rehnquist cited statistics on the
frequency of teenage pregnancy and its concomitant risks. 56 He also
observed that illegitimate children of teenage mothers are likely to become wards of the state.5 7 Apparently likening Michael M. to cases of

benign classification, Justice Rehnquist asserted that a legislature "may
'58
provide for the special problems of women."
The plurality enunciated two grounds for finding that the California classification demonstrated the nexus between means and ends required to pass constitutional muster. First, it justified the classification
-on the ground that, because women would naturally be deterred from
unlawful sexual intercourse by the risk of pregnancy, imposing criminal
penalties on men was necessary to "roughly 'equalize' the deterrents on
the sexes." 59 Second, the plurality opined that a gender-neutral statutory rape law would frustrate effective enforcement of the law because
"a female is surely less likely to report violations of the statute if she
herself would be subject to criminal prosecution." 60 The plurality denied that this justification was one of "solely . . . administrative
6t
convenience."
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart emphasized that this ad450 U.S. at 466.
55 "We are satisfied not only that the prevention of illegitimate pregnancy is at least one
of the 'purposes' of the statute, but also that the state has a strong interest in preventing such
pregnancy." Id at 470. "[S]uch a statute is sufficiently related to the State's objectives to
pass constitutional muster." Id at 472-73.
56 Id at 470-71 nn.3-4.
57 Id at 470-71. The plurality regarded California's statistics with less skepticism than
that found in earlier gender-discrimination cases. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 204
("[P]roving broad sociological propositions by statistics is a dubious business, and one that
inevitably is in tension with the normative philosophy that underlies the Equal Protection
Clause."). The acceptance of statistics in Michael M. may be partly explained in that the
plurality cites them to support the "important governmental objective" prong of the middle
tier test. Statistics indicating a need for legislation are arguably more accurate than statistics
used to support implementing schemes under the second prong of the test. Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist primarily relied on the statistics in emphasizing the desirability of the goal,
and failed to scrutinize them adequately in discerning the actual objective. See in/ra notes 7379 and accompanying text.
58 450 U.S. at 469 (quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975));see in/ra
notes 97-101.
59
450 U.S. at 473.
60
Id at 473-74.
61
Id at 476 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (emphasis omitted)). According to the Court in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971), administrative
convenience does not justify a gender-based classification, even under the rational basis test.
54
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mittedly discriminatory statute is but "one part of a broad statutory
scheme that protects all minors from the problems and risks attendant
upon adolescent sexual activity. ' 62 He upheld the constitutionality of
the gender-specific statutory rape law because other statutes in California's Penal Code subject women to criminal liability for certain sex-related acts involving minors. 63 Within this arguably more limited
framework, Justice Stewart echoed the arguments of the plurality for
64
the constitutionality of the statute.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White and Marshall, dissented.
The dissenters first questioned the validity of the asserted state goal.
They argued that the historical context of the statute and California
case law revealed that the actual purpose behind the statute was the
protection of the chastity of young girls and that the drafters presumed
them too naive to consent to sexual relations. 65 The dissenters also contended that, regardless of the validity of the statutory purpose, California did not sustain its burden of proving that a gender-neutral law
would be less effective than the challenged gender-based statute. They
noted that thirty-seven jurisdictions had enacted gender-neutral statutory rape laws,66 and emphasized the lack of evidence for the plurality's
view that a gender-neutral statute would frustrate enforcement. 67 They
further pointed to California's gender-neutral statutes prohibiting sodomy and oral copulation, and to the state's failure to distinguish enforcement of these statutes from that of a gender-neutral statutory rape
law. 68

See also Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981); Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446
U.S. 142 (1980).
62 450 U.S. at 477.
63
Id
64 In a second concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun suggested that the case of H.L. v.
Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981), a case decided the same day, influenced his decision in
Mfichael A. See in/a notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
65 450 U.S. at 494-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see in/ra note 78 and accompanying text.
66 450 U.S. at 492 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
67 See id at 491 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("To meet [its burden of showing that the
gender classification is more effective than a gender-neutral law], the State must show that
because its statutory rape law punishes only males, and not females, it more effectively deters
minor females from having sexual intercourse.');see in/ta notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
68 450 U.S. at 493 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice
Stevens attacked the plurality's argument that the risk of pregnancy justified exempting females from prosecution:
[T]he fact that a class of persons is especially vulnerable to a risk that a statute
is designed to avoid is a reason for making the statute applicable to that
class. . . . Surely, if we examine the problem from the point of view of society's interest in preventing the risk creating conduct from occuring at all, it is
irrational to exempt 50% of the potential violators.
Id at 499 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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III
"HARD CASES MAKE BAD LAW"

69

Despite its use of middle tier language, the plurality in Michael A.
actually applied the less stringent "rational basis"70 test in upholding
California's statutory rape law. As the dissenters persuasively argued,
the state established neither an "important governmental objective" nor
an "substantial relationship" between the objective and the gender classification. The radically different conclusions that the plurality reached
may signal a reevaluation by the Court of equal protection analysis in
the context of gender classificaiton.
A.

The Middle Tier Test as Applied in Michael M.
1. Important Governmental Objective

The state of California claimed that the important governmental
objective underlying section 261 of the California Penal Code was the
prevention of illegitimate teenage pregnancies. According to prior case
law, the Court should have demanded some showing that prevention of
pregnancy was in fact a goal of the legislation. 71 The plurality in
MichaelM did not inquire meaningfully into the actual purposes of section 261. 72 Rather, the plurality focused on the desirability of the asserted goal, 73 and gave only perfunctory treatment to the question of
actual objective. 74 The Court's failure to demand that California prove
69

Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
See supra note 3.
71 See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
72 In dissent, Justice Brennan went further to suggest that even if the asserted objective
was valid, the means used to achieve that goal might be unconstitutional:
Petitioner has not questioned the State's constitutional power to achieve its
asserted objective by criminalizing consensual sexual activity. However, I
note that our cases would not foreclose such a privacy challenge. . . . [I]t is
not settled that a State may rely on a pregnancy-prevention justification to
make consensual sexual intercourse among minors a criminal act.
450 U.S. at 491 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
73 Id at 470-72. The plurality emphasized the frequency and risks of teenage pregnancy. Id It ignored significant legislative history indicating that the legislature did not in
fact create the challenged classification to combat the problem of teenage pregnancy. Se supra
note 57; infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
74 450 U.S. at 470. Justice Rehnquist merely stated that "although our cases establish
that the state's asserted reason for the enactment of a statute may be rejected, if it 'could not
have been the goal of the legislation,' this is not such a case." Id (quoting Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 648). The quoted language, however, referred to an examination of
legislative history to determine whether the asserted state purpose could have been a goal of
the challenged legislation. See supra note 25. When legislative history is unavailable, the legislative purpose must be ascertained by other means. Although speculation may be warranted
in the absence of legislative history, such speculation is inappropriate in MichaelA Remarkably, California had preserved the notes of the drafter of the 1872 statute. These notes clearly
reveal the legislative intent in enacting the statutory rape provision. See injfa note 75 and
accompanying text.
In MichaelM., Justice Rehnquist refused to address the historical context and legislative
70
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its asserted purpose for the law assumes special significance because
"[u]ntil very recently, no California court or commentator had suggested that the purpose of California's statutory rape law was to protect
young women from the risk of pregnancy."7 5 In earlier gender-classification cases, the Court had explicitly rejected discriminatory schemes
supported by the state's "mere recitation" 76 of a permissible purpose in
the face of significant contradictory history. 77 The plurality's extraordinary deference to the state's claimed statutory purpose in Michael M. is
characteristic of the "rational relationship" test traditionally applied in
cases in which suspect classes, fundamental rights, or gender classifica78
tions are absent.
history of the California statute in determining the validity of the asserted purpose of pregnancy prevention. His willingness to accept an avowed purpose that conflicted with the legislative history of § 261 constitutes inadequate scrutiny under the middle tier test. A state's
mere assertion of purpose does not suffice to discharge its burden. The state must produce
evidence to persuade the court that its assertions are true. When legislative history is available, the court should inquire "into the actual purposes" of the discriminatory statute to
determine the validity of the asserted purpose. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 648.
75 450 U.S. at 494 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The only legislative history available, the draftsmen's notes to the Penal Code
of 1872, supports the view that the purpose of California's statutory rape law
was to protect those who were too young to give consent. The draftsmen
explained that the "[statutory rape] provision embodies the well settled rule of
the existing law; that a girl under ten years of age is incapable of giving any
consent to an act of intercourse ... " There was no mention whatever of
pregnancy prevention.
Id at 495 n.9. See generally Myers, Reasonable Mistake of Age: A Needed Defense to Statutoy Rape,
64 MICH. L. REv. 105, 119-22 (1965); Note, Forcible and Statutor Rape: An Explanation ofthe
Operation and Objectives of the Consent Standard, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 74-76 (1952). Recent case law
in California confirms this understanding of the intent behind § 261.5:
[The underage female] is presumed too innocent and naive to understand the
implications and nature of her act. . . . The law's concern with her capacity
or lack thereof to so understand is explained in part by a popular conception
of the social, moral and personal values which are preserved by the abstinence
from sexual indulgence on the part of a young woman. An unwise disposition
of her sexual favor is deemed to do harm both to herself and the social mores
by which the community's conduct patterns are established. Hence the law of
statutory rape intervenes in an effort to avoid such a disposition.
People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529, 531, 393 P.2d 673, 674, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361, 362 (1964).
76 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975).
77 In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, id, the Court rejected the government's asserted "benign" purpose because it conflicted with the legislative history. The Court determined that
the statute providing Social Security benefits to surviving widows, but not to their male counterparts, resulted not from the asserted compensatory motives, but from assumptions about
the role of women. Id at 651; see Ginsburg, supra note 42, at 818-19; supra note 26 and
accompanying text.
78 The plurality relied on Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), to support the deference that it accorded the state court's acceptance of the asserted purpose. In Reitman, however, the Court deferred to the California court's determination that a clause in the California
Constitution violated the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. Id at
376-79. The California court in Reitman based its determination on a clear historical trend,
and did not endorse an unsupported post hoc rationalization offered to justify an admittedly
discriminatory law. Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 534-35, 413 P.2d 825, 829, 50 Cal.
Rptr. 881, 884-85 aft'd, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). The plurality in MichaelkM. improperly relied on
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Had the state adequately demonstrated that preventing pregnancy
was actually a goal of California's statutory rape law, its showing of the
goal's importance would have been adequate. The state did proffer statistics demonstrating the magnitude of the problem of illegitimate teenage pregnancy and the probability that children born to unmarried
minors would become wards of the state. Although the Court has regarded statistics skeptically in other gender-discrimination cases, 79 the
plurality appeared satisfied that these statistics proved the importance
of the state's asserted goal. The Court, therefore, could reasonably have
found that pregnancy prevention was an important purpose. The plurality's attention to statistics, however, obscured the question of actual
purpose, and lent credence to a proposition that was otherwise without
support.
2. SubstantialRelationships
Assuming the validity of the asserted purpose, the dissenters properly concluded that the Court overemphasized the desirability of teenage pregnancy prevention and failed to consider adequately the
relationship between the gender-based statutory rape statute and the
achievement of the asserted goal. The plurality's contention that punishing only males who engage in consensual sexual intercourse with minor females "'equalize[s]' the deterrents on the sexes" 80 cannot be a
legitimate ground for upholding the statutory classification. 81 The plurality argued that the discrimination was justified because "young men
and young women are not similarly situated with respect to the . . .
risks of sexual intercourse"8 2 but this revelation cannot justify differential treatment of "partners in crime." The Court failed to provide support for this rationale, perhaps because criminal statutes rarely, if ever,
Reitman, and in doing so, effectively decided a point reserved by the Court in Craigv. Boren:
"[We leave] for another day consideration of whether. . . the Court must determine if the
litigant simply is selecting a convenient, but false, post hoc rationalization." 429 U.S. at 200
n.7. The extraordinary deference given to the state's asserted purpose in Michael/M. is reminiscent of the Court's ruling in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1960), that when applying the rational basis test a "statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of
facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." Id at 426; see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
79 See supra note 57.
80 450 U.S. at 473.
81 A series of lower court cases rejected gender-based statutory rape statutes as unconstituational. These courts failed to find a substantial relationship between the goals of protecting young women against injury or pregnancy and the gender-based means of reaching
that goal. See, e.g., Navedo v. Preisser, 630 F.2d 636, 640 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Hicks, 625 F.2d 216, 220 (9th Cir. 1980); Meloon v. Helgemoe, 564 F.2d 602 (lst Cir. 1977),
vacated, 450 U.S. 1038 (1981); see also Note CriminalLaw--Equal Protection-Gender-BasedStatatoyy Rape Provision HeldInvalid, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 310 (1981) (advocating the approach taken
in UnitedStates v. Hicks). But see Hall v. McKenzie, 537 F.2d 1232 (4th Cir. 1976).
82 450 U.S. at 471.
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predicate punishment on physical differences between participants.8 3
Accomplices in crime may be punished less severely than primary actors, but the criminal law bases this determination on their relative culpability, rather than on the consequences each will suffer outside of the
84
criminal law.

The accomplice analogy exposes the real nature of the Court's decision in Michael M. In justifying the California statute, Justice Stewart
argued that "females may be brought within the proscription of § 261.5
itself, since a female may be charged with aiding and abetting its violation."'85 If a female may be charged with aiding and abetting the act of
statutory rape, however, the disproportionate impact of the prohibited
behavior on her cannot be the rationale for exempting her from prosecution. If deterrent equalization really explains the different treatment afforded females under the statute, there would be no possibility of a
charge of aiding and abetting. Furthermore, assuming that a charge of
aiding and abetting was consistent with deterrent equalization, when
would such a charge lie? Presumably, a woman would only be charged
with aiding and abetting if she were deemed the culpable aggressor.
The logical extension of Justice Stewart's argument that women are not
in fact exempt from the proscription of the act contradicts the plurality's
contention that deterrent equalization, and not the assumption that the
male is the "culpable aggressor," justifies the gender classification. The
Court thus appears to rely upon its own notions of relative responsibility
for sexual activity in allowing the gender classification to stand. The
Court developed the middle tier test to avoid precisely this kind of invidious discrimination based on discarded notions of the roles of women
and men.
The Court also failed to support its second rationale for upholding
the statutory means-ends nexus. The plurality's assumption that the
statutory rape law is a significant deterrent is open to debate. Furthermore, the Court, in rejecting the petitioner's claim of underinclusiveness, 86 and by accepting the state's contention that a gender-neutral
83

In support of this contention, Judge Mosk of the California Supreme Court wrote in

his dissent in Michael M: "In our system of justice, offenders are not deemed less culpable
merely because they may suffer additional punishment from sources outside the legal system."
Michael M. v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 608, 622, 601 P.2d 572, 581, 159 Cal. Rptr. 340, 349
(1979) (Mosk, J., dissenting) afl'd, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
84 See W. LAFAvE & A. Scor, CRIMINAL LAW 507 (1972) ("[T]he accomplice may be
convicted, on an accomplice liability theory, only for those crimes as to which he [or she]
personally has the requisite mental state. . . ."). By consenting to sexual relations, the minor
female necessarily possesses the requisite mental state for the crime of "unlawful sexual intercourse" under the California statute, unless the statute impermissibly presumes that she is
incapable of consent.
85 450 U.S. at 477 (Stewart, J., concurring). The plurality, in contrast, vehemently denied that the statute "presumes that as between two persons under 18, the male is the culpable aggressor." Id at 475.
86 Id at 473.
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statute would present significant enforcement problems,8 7 neglected to
recognize that at the time of the opinion, thirty-seven jurisdictions had
gender-neutral statutory rape laws. By accepting the state's speculation
as to possible enforcement problems, 88 the Court ignored the experience
of the majority of American jurisdictions. 89 Instead, the Court should
have demanded, as the dissenters did, that the substantial relationship
be demonstrated in light of available data.
The case law supports the dissenters' demand that the state prove
the superiority of the gender-based classification for its statutory scheme.
In Wengler v.Druggists MutualInsurance Co., 90 the Court noted that "[t]he
burden . . .is on those defending the discrimination to make out the
claimed justification. . . ."9 The Court reaffirmed this principle in
I irchberg v. Feenstra,92 a case decided the same day as Michael M. In
Kirchberg, the Court unanimously struck down a Louisiana statute that
granted exclusive control over the disposition of community property.
"[T]he burden remains on the party seeking to uphold a statute that
expressly discriminates on the basis of sex to advance an 'exceedingly
persuasive justification' for the challenged classification. '93 The plurality apparently had an "exceedingly" short memory. Rather than relying
on this clear precedent from recent cases, the Court in Michael M. re94
verted to the more deferential approach articulated in Kahn v.Shevin,
the original "benign" classification case: "The issue, of course, is not
whether the statute could have been drafted more wisely, but whether
the lines chosen by the Florida Legislature are within constitutional
limitations." 95
The rule that emerges from these confusing precedents is that a
gender classification, unless "benign" and enacted for a compensatory
purpose, must be narrowly drawn, and the state has the burden ofjustifying the statutory classification. The statute challenged in Michael M.,
however, cannot be considered "benign" when judged under previous
Supreme Court standards. The Court has consistently defined "benign"
87 Id at 473-74.
88 Id The dissenters speculated more persuasively than did the state as to the effect of a
gender-neutral statutory rape law:
Common sense, however, suggests that a gender-neutral statutory rape law is
potentially a greater deterrent of sexual activity than a gender-based law, for
the simple reason that a gender-neutral law subjects both men and women to
criminal sanctions and thus arguably has a deterrent effect on twice as many
potential violators.
Id. at 493-94 (emphasis in original).
89 Id at 492-93.
90 446 U.S. 142 (1980).
91 Id at 151.
92 450 U.S. 455 (1981).
93 Id at 461 (quoting Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979)).
94 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
95 Id at 356 n.10.
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statutory purposes as those designed to compensate women for past discrimination. Although section 261 is arguably "benign" in the sense
that it protects rather than burdens women, this broad definition of a
"benign" purpose is inconsistent with the Court's equation of "benign"
and "compensatory." The dissenters, therefore, appropriately placed
the burden on the state to show the statute's constitutionality, for California did not enact the statute challenged in Michael M. for compensatory purposes. California's failure to show the superiority of a gender96
based statutory scheme should have invalidated the statute.
B.

Michael M. and the Equal ProtectionDoctrine

In the plurality opinion, Justice Rehnquist correctly observed that
the Supreme Court has stated that "a legislature may 'provide for the
special problems of women.' ,,97 Indeed, the Court has upheld gender
classifications in "spheres" 98 in which women and men are not similarly
situated.99 Until now, however, the Court has limited these "spheres" to
situations in which gender differences resulted from different historical
roles and opportunities.10 0 MichaelM.seems to broaden the definition of
"not similarly situated" to include biological differences as well. In
Michael M., the Court appears to supplement the "invidious" and "benign" categories of cases with a third category based on the physiological differences between men and women.10 1 This third category could
96

The petitioner argued that the statute was overinclusive, but this argument received

only perfunctory treatment from the Court. 450 U.S. at 475. In the California Supreme
Court, the petitioner argued that if the statute were truly designed to discourage illegitimate
teenage pregnancy, it would "remov[e] from the ambit of the statute, either as female victims
or male offenders, all those who use birth control devices or techniques and all those otherwise
incapable of procreation." 25 Cal. 3d at 612-13, 601 P.2d at 575, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 343. The
United States Supreme Court altogether ignored the existence of birth control, and dismissed
as "ludicrous" the notion that a statute supposedly concerned with pregnancy would be limited in its application to those old enough to become pregnant. 450 U.S. at 475. The overinclusiveness argument is important because it challenges not only the purpose asserted by the
State, but also the discriminatory means employed. See Comment, Gender BasedStatutgy Rape
Legislationandthe Equal ProlectionClause: Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 19
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 99, 113-14 (1981).
97 450 U.S. at 469 (quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 653).
98 Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 280 (1979).
99 See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
100 See Ginsburg, supra note 42.
101
Ironically, in discussing the limited propriety of "benign" legislation in the gender
context, Professor (now Judge) Ginsburg argues that "[i]f benign sex classification ever had a
place, it is in this area [of women's childbearing capacity]." Id at 825. She cites a number of
inconsistent cases dealing with the protection of pregnant women from gender-based discrimination. See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977) (women entitled to accumulated
job seniority during pregnancy leave); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (Title
VII permits exclusion of pregnant employees from employers' nonoccupational disability
benefit plan); Turner v. Department of Employment Sec., 423 U.S. 44 (1975) (women cannot
be automatically denied unemployment benefits during the period extending from 12 weeks
before childbirth until six weeks after birth); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (the
Constitution does not require the legislature to provide income security for pregnant women
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serve as a ground for upholding virtually all gender classifications, and
thus could destroy the effectiveness of the equal protection doctrine in
the gender context.
Once a woman's capacity to conceive becomes a valid reason for
upholding a gender classification, a state might justify any gender classification on this ground, assuming it articulated an "important state purpose." After the Court's extraordinary deference to the state's asserted
rationale in Michael M., the requirement that the state provide an important purpose is substantially diminished. For example, consider a hypothetical case based on the facts of Muller v. Oregon. 102 The 1908
Oregon statute challenged in Muller provided:
That no female [shall] be employed in any mechanical establishment,
or factory, or laundry in this State more than ten hours during any
one day. The hours of work may be so arranged as to permit the
employment of females at any time so that they shall not work more
than ten hours during the twenty-four hours of any one day.103
The law applied only to women. 01 4 Suppose a state enacted similar legislation today. Just as the Michael M. Court upheld the discriminatory
statute because young men and young women are not similarly situated
as to the risks of pregnancy, the hypothetical state could assert that men
and women are not similarly situated because only women assume the
risk to future childbearing of demanding work over long periods of
time. 105 The state could rely, as did California in Michael M., on statistics showing the effect of the regulated behavior on some women's
childbearing capacities. Therefore, just as the court in Michael M. upheld the classification even though the impact of the prohibited behavior on any given woman might be negligible, a Court could uphold the
reincarnated 1903 Oregon statute regardless of the impact of the work
on any particular woman, or her desire to have children. The failure of
the Court in Michael M. to articulate when and how a "gender for its
own sake" classification may lie thus allows statutes, heretofore inexcusable because invidious, to be recast in terms of biological differences bewhen it provides such security for other temporarily disabled employees); Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (pregnant school teachers may not be involuntarily
dismissed at an arbitrarily fixed stage of pregnancy). Professor Ginsburg persuasively argues
that women's capacity to give birth should be judicially recognized, and that employers
should not be allowed to treat it as a liability. She limits her argument, however, to the
employment sphere; her approach is thus not susceptible to the abuse invited by the broad
biological rule of Michael M
102
208 U.S. 412 (1908).
103 Id at 416-17.
104
Id
105
This hypothetical, admittedly far-fetched, suggests the abuses that MichaeM. invites.
A more plausible hypothetical case, and consequently a more difficult one, would be a statute
excluding all women from certain kinds of employment because the work requires exposure to
substances particularly harmful to a developing fetus.
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tween men and women, obliterating the vitality of the equal protection
clause for women.
It is not surprising that the Court's creation of this potential third
category of gender-discrimination cases arises in the context of statutory
rape legislation. Historically, the Court has ruled inconsistently on ques06
tions relating to procreation, contraception, pregnancy, and abortion.1
The Court's vacillation between the rights of women to self-determination and the interest of the state in women's procreative affairs increases
when minor females are concerned. 10 7 The Court's acceptance of California's pregnancy-prevention rationale and of the state's tenuous showing of the required means-ends nexus may reflect the Court's attempt to
harmonize the the holding of Michael M. with HL. v. Matheson, 108 another case decided that day, rather than the Court's genuine belief in
California's assertions. In Matheson, the Court upheld a Utah statute
requiring physicians to "notify, if possible" the parents of an unmarried
dependent minor female before performing an abortion. The Court was
probably reluctant to rule that young women may consent freely to intercourse, but may not have an abortion without parental notification.
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in Michael M. demonstrates his
concern with harmonizing the results in the two cases:
Some might conclude that the two uses of the criminal sanction-here
flatly to forbid intercourse in order to forestall teenage pregnancies,
and in Matheson to prohibit a physician's abortion procedure except
upon notice to the parents of the pregnant minor-are vastly different
proscriptions. But the basic social and privacy problems are much the
same. Both Utah's statute in Matheson and California's statute in this
case are legislatively created tools intended to achieve similar ends
and addressed to the same societal concerns: the control and direction
of young people's sexual activities.' 0 9
An interest in consistency in one area of substantive law, however,
106 On the one hand, the Court has consistently protected the privacy rights of individuals to choose whether and when to have children, regardless of their marital status and age.
See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (statute proscribing the distribution
of contraceptives to persons under 16 unconstitutional); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (statute proscribing distribution of contraceptives to unmarried people unconstitutional); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (statute prohibiting the use and distribution of contraceptives unconstitutional). On the other hand, the court has not been
consistent in cases involving the rights of women once they have become pregnant, see supra
note 101, or in cases involving abortion. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (woman
has right to privacy that precludes state intervention in her choice to have an abortion during
the early stages of her pregnancy) with H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (dependent
minor female's right to privacy allows her to choose to have an abortion, but a state may
require parental notification against her wishes, effectively negating the privacy of her
choice).
107 See supra note 106 and accompanying text; infra note 110 and accompanying text.

108

450 U.S. 398 (1981); see supra note 106.

109

450 U.S. at 482 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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should not serve as an excuse to undermine a sound doctrine of far
broader application. The Court could easily have distinguished the two
holdings,11 0 thus obviating the possibility of creating a rule that may
swallow up the entire equal protection doctrine in the gender context.
The precise holding in Michael M. remains unclear, partly because
of the substantive questions it leaves unanswered, and partly because of
the inherently limited precedential value of plurality opinions. Arguably, the case may be limited to its facts. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart suggested that the statute in question was constitutional in
the context of all the California legislation that protects minors from the
risks of sexual activity."' The constitutionality of a statute, however,
should not depend merely on the existence of other statutes. The repeal
of the other statutes would leave a discriminatory law whose constitutionality might be incapable of determination because of res judicata
principles. Thus, although limiting the holding in Michael M. might be
attractive, the presence of other statutes in California's Penal Code cannot serve as a solid basis for such a narrow reading of the case.
In addition, because the Court in MichaelM. explicitly endorses the
middle tier test, but neglects to apply that standard properly, MichaelM.
may be used to support contradictory legal arguments based on different
standards of review and on an unwieldy "biology" test. Opponents of
gender equality may use the decision to justify statutes prohibited in the
past because they were invidious. The decision may serve as a signal to
those opponents that the Court is willing to reconsider the use of the
fourteenth amendment to secure women's equality, especially in light of
the recent failure to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment. 12 The Court
110 The Court could have distinguished Michae M. from H.L v. Matheson on the ground
that the statute challenged in HL v. Matheson arguably did not deprive young women of the
right to choose an abortion. The statute required parental notification, but did not bar her
decision altogether. On the other hand, the statute in Michael M. gave no minor female,
regardless of her maturity, a right to consent to sexual relations without subjecting her partner to criminal liability.
111 450 U.S. at 476-77 (Stewart, J., concurring).
112 The Equal Rights Amendment has already affected equal protection cases in the gender-discrimination context. In Frontiero v. Richardson, Justice Powell's concurring opinion
demonstrated the reluctance of certain members of the Court to preempt the ERA ratification process by declaring gender a suspect class. The concurring Justices were afraid to interfere with a "political" process and, as a result, refused to expand the fourteenth amendment
to encompass gender equality at a time when an explicit amendment appeared imminent.
The Equal Rights Amendment, which if adopted will resolve the substance of
this precise question, has been approved by the Congress. . . . By acting prematurely and unnecessarily, as I view it, the Court has assumed a decisional
responsibility at the very time when state legislatures, functioning within the
traditional democratic process, are debating the proposed Amendment.
411 U.S. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring). By adopting the middle tier scrutiny, the Court
appears to have balanced the demands of women for immediate protection under the Constitution against the needs of some of the Justices for the clearer mandate that seemed forthcoming. In the wake of the failure to ratify the ERA, the Supreme Court should reaffirm the
already-existing rights of women under the Constitution. The Court has consistently refused
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could not have intended Michael M. to mark so radical and underhanded a departure from an analysis it explicitly continues to support.
One can only hope that Michael M. is merely an instance of judicial
shortsightedness, and an anomaly in the equal protection doctrine. In
future cases, the Court will have to clarify its doctrinal intent in the
MichaelM. decision.
CONCLUSION

In an effort to sidestep an emotionally-charged issue, the Court in
MichaelM. appears to have created a bizarre exception to the invidiousbenign dichotomy; the statute at issue in Michael M. exemplifies the
worst attributes of both kinds of gender classification. The Court upholds a statute that is "protective" in its effect, without the historical
demand for a concurrent compensatory purpose. The Court, while purporting to apply the middle tier level of scrutiny, actually applied the
rational basis test. Michael M. can thus be used to justify contradictory
constitutional arguments in gender-discrimination cases. Michael M.,
however, is not merely an instance of improper scrutiny. The case also
suggests a third category of gender classification statutes based on physiology to supplement the invidious-benign dichotomy previously developed by the Court. A rule that justifies classifications predicated on the
biological differences between men and women might be used to justify
gender discrimination that was unconstitutional in the past. The Court
should limit and clarify its holding in Michael M., rather than use the
case to undermine the equal protection doctrine that has permitted important advances towards gender equality.
Leslie G. Landau

to allow constitutional rights to expand and contract with changes in public sentiment. The
Court must make clear that existing constitutional rights will not dissolve merely because
state legislators failed to enact a constitutional amendment that would make those rights
explicit.

